Abstract. In the multiarmed bandit problem, a gambler must decide which arm of K nonidentical slot machines to play in a sequence of trials so as to maximize his reward. This classical problem has received much attention because of the simple model it provides of the trade-off between exploration (trying out each arm to find the best one) and exploitation (playing the arm believed to give the best payoff). Past solutions for the bandit problem have almost always relied on assumptions about the statistics of the slot machines.
Introduction.
In the multiarmed bandit problem, originally proposed by Robbins [17] , a gambler must choose which of K slot machines to play. At each time step, he pulls the arm of one of the machines and receives a reward or payoff (possibly zero or negative). The gambler's purpose is to maximize his return, i.e., the sum of the rewards he receives over a sequence of pulls. In this model, each arm is assumed to deliver rewards that are independently drawn from a fixed and unknown distribution. As reward distributions differ from arm to arm, the goal is to find the arm with the highest expected payoff as early as possible and then to keep gambling using that best arm.
The problem is a paradigmatic example of the trade-off between exploration and exploitation. On the one hand, if the gambler plays exclusively on the machine that he thinks is best ("exploitation"), he may fail to discover that one of the other arms actually has a higher expected payoff. On the other hand, if he spends too much time trying out all the machines and gathering statistics ("exploration"), he may fail to play the best arm often enough to get a high return.
The gambler's performance is typically measured in terms of "regret." This is the difference between the expected return of the optimal strategy (pulling consistently the best arm) and the gambler's expected return. Lai and Robbins proved that the gambler's regret over T pulls can be made, for T → ∞, as small as O(ln T ). Furthermore, they prove that this bound is optimal in the following sense: there is no strategy for the gambler with a better asymptotic performance.
Though this formulation of the bandit problem allows an elegant statistical treatment of the exploration-exploitation trade-off, it may not be adequate to model certain environments. As a motivating example, consider the task of repeatedly choosing a route for transmitting packets between two points in a communication network. To cast this scenario within the bandit problem, suppose there is a only a fixed number of possible routes and the transmission cost is reported back to the sender. Now, it is likely that the costs associated with each route cannot be modeled by a stationary distribution, so a more sophisticated set of statistical assumptions would be required. In general, it may be difficult or impossible to determine the right statistical assumptions for a given domain, and some domains may exhibit dependencies to an extent that no such assumptions are appropriate.
To provide a framework where one could model scenarios like the one sketched above, we present the adversarial bandit problem, a variant of the bandit problem in which no statistical assumptions are made about the generation of rewards. We assume only that each slot machine is initially assigned an arbitrary and unknown sequence of rewards, one for each time step, chosen from a bounded real interval. Each time the gambler pulls the arm of a slot machine, he receives the corresponding reward from the sequence assigned to that slot machine. To measure the gambler's performance in this setting we replace the notion of (statistical) regret with that of worst-case regret. Given any sequence (j 1 , . . . , j T ) of pulls, where T > 0 is an arbitrary time horizon and each j t is the index of an arm, the worst-case regret of a gambler for this sequence of pulls is the difference between the return the gambler would have had by pulling arms j 1 , . . . , j T and the actual gambler's return, where both returns are determined by the initial assignment of rewards. It is easy to see that, in this model, the gambler cannot keep his regret small (say, sublinear in T ) for all sequences of pulls and with respect to the worst-case assignment of rewards to the arms. Thus, to make the problem feasible, we allow the regret to depend on the "hardness" of the sequence of pulls for which it is measured, where the hardness of a sequence is roughly the number of times one has to change the slot machine currently being played in order to pull the arms in the order given by the sequence. This trick allows us to effectively control the worst-case regret simultaneously for all sequences of pulls, even though (as one should expect) our regret bounds become trivial when the hardness of the sequence (j 1 , . . . , j T ) we compete against gets too close to T .
As a remark, note that a deterministic bandit problem was also considered by Gittins [9] and Ishikida and Varaiya [13] . However, their version of the bandit problem is very different from ours: they assume that the player can compute ahead of time exactly what payoffs will be received from each arm, and their problem is thus one of optimization, rather than exploration and exploitation.
Our most general result is a very efficient, randomized player algorithm whose expected regret for any sequence of pulls is 1 O(S KT ln(KT )), where S is the hardness of the sequence (see Theorem 8.1 and Corollaries 8. 2, 8.4) . Note that this bound holds simultaneously for all sequences of pulls, for any assignments of rewards to the arms, and uniformly over the time horizon T . If the gambler is willing to impose an upper bound S on the hardness of the sequences of pulls for which he wants to measure his regret, an improved bound O( SKT ln(KT )) on the expected regret for these sequences can be proven (see Corollaries 8.3 and 8.5) .
With the purpose of establishing connections with certain results in game theory, we also look at a special case of the worst-case regret, which we call "weak regret." Given a time horizon T , call "best arm" the arm that has the highest return (sum of assigned rewards) up to time T with respect to the initial assignment of rewards. The gambler's weak regret is the difference between the return of this best arm and the actual gambler's return. In the paper we introduce a randomized player algorithm, tailored to this notion of regret, whose expected weak regret is O( √ KG max ln K), where G max is the return of the best arm-see Theorem 4.1 in section 4. As before, this bound holds for any assignments of rewards to the arms and uniformly over the choice of the time horizon T . Using a more complex player algorithm, we also prove that the weak regret is O( KT ln(KT /δ)) with probability at least 1 − δ over the algorithm's randomization, for any fixed δ > 0; see Theorems 6.3 and 6.4 in section 6. This also implies that, asymptotically for T → ∞ and K constant, the weak regret is O( T (ln T ) 1+ε ) with probability 1 for any fixed ε > 0; see Corollary 6.5.
Our worst-case bounds may appear weaker than the bounds proved using statistical assumptions, such as those shown by Lai and Robbins [14] of the form O(ln T ). However, when comparing our results to those in the statistics literature, it is important to point out an important difference in the asymptotic quantification. In the work of Lai and Robbins, the assumption is that the distribution of rewards that is associated with each arm is fixed as the total number of iterations T increases to infinity. In contrast, our bounds hold for any finite T , and, by the generality of our model, these bounds are applicable when the payoffs are randomly (or adversarially) chosen in a manner that does depend on T . It is this quantification order, and not the adversarial nature of our framework, which is the cause for the apparent gap. We prove this point in Theorem 5.1, where we show that, for any player algorithm for the K-armed bandit problem and for any T , there exists a set of K reward distributions such that the expected weak regret of the algorithm when playing on these arms for T time steps is Ω( √ KT ). So far we have considered notions of regret that compare the return of the gambler to the return of a sequence of pulls or to the return of the best arm. A further notion of regret which we explore is the regret for the best strategy in a given set of strategies that are available to the gambler. The notion of "strategy" generalizes that of "sequence of pulls": at each time step a strategy gives a recommendation, in the form of a probability distribution over the K arms, as to which arm to play next. Given an assignment of rewards to the arms and a set of N strategies for the gambler, call "best strategy" the strategy that yields the highest return with respect to this assignment. Then the regret for the best strategy is the difference between the return of this best strategy and the actual gambler's return. Using a randomized player that combines the choices of the N strategies (in the same vein as the algorithms for "prediction with expert advice" from [3] ), we show that the expected regret for the best strategy is O( √ KT ln N )-see Theorem 7.1. Note that the dependence on the number of strategies is only logarithmic, and therefore the bound is quite reasonable even when the player is combining a very large number of strategies.
The adversarial bandit problem is closely related to the problem of learning to play an unknown N -person finite game, where the same game is played repeatedly by N players. A desirable property for a player is Hannan-consistency, which is similar to saying (in our bandit framework) that the weak regret per time step of the player converges to 0 with probability 1. Examples of Hannan-consistent player strategies have been provided by several authors in the past (see [5] for a survey of these results). By applying (slight extensions of) Theorems 6.3 and 6.4, we can provide an example of a simple Hannan-consistent player whose convergence rate is optimal up to logarithmic factors. Our player algorithms are based in part on an algorithm presented by Freund and Schapire [6, 7] , which in turn is a variant of Littlestone and Warmuth's [15] weighted majority algorithm and Vovk's [18] aggregating strategies. In the setting analyzed by Freund and Schapire, the player scores on each pull the reward of the chosen arm but gains access to the rewards associated with all of the arms (not just the one that was chosen).
Notation and terminology.
An adversarial bandit problem is specified by the number K of possible actions, where each action is denoted by an integer 1 ≤ i ≤ K, and by an assignment of rewards, i.e., an infinite sequence t−1 of action indices and previous rewards to the set of action indices.
For any reward assignment and for any T > 0, let
be the return at time horizon T of algorithm A choosing actions i 1 , i 2 , . . . . In what follows, we will write G A instead of G A (T ) whenever the value of T is clear from the context. Our measure of performance for a player algorithm is the worst-case regret, and in this paper we explore variants of the notion of regret. Given any time horizon T > 0 and any sequence of actions (j 1 , . . . , j T ), the (worst-case) regret of algorithm A for (j 1 , . . . , j T ) is the difference
where
is the return, at time horizon T , obtained by choosing actions j 1 , . . . , j T . Hence, the regret (1) measures how much the player lost (or gained, depending on the sign of the difference) by following strategy A instead of choosing actions j 1 , . . . , j T . A special case of this is the regret of A for the best single action (which we will call weak regret for short), defined by
is the return of the single globally best action at time horizon T . As before, we will write G max instead of G max (T ) whenever the value of T is clear from the context.
As our player algorithms will be randomized, fixing a player algorithm defines a probability distribution over the set of all sequences of actions. All the probabilities P{·} and expectations E[·] considered in this paper will be taken with respect to this distribution.
In what follows, we will prove two kinds of bounds on the performance of a (randomized) player A. The first is a bound on the expected regret
of A for an arbitrary sequence (j 1 , . . . , j T ) of actions. The second is a confidence bound on the weak regret. This has the form
and states that, with high probability, the return of A up to time T is not much smaller than that of the globally best action.
Finally, we remark that all of our bounds hold for any sequence x(1), x(2), . . . of reward assignments, and most of them hold uniformly over the time horizon T (i.e., they hold for all T without requiring T as input parameter).
3.
Upper bounds on the weak regret. In this section we present and analyze our simplest player algorithm, Exp3 (which stands for "exponential-weight algorithm for exploration and exploitation"). We will show a bound on the expected regret of Exp3 with respect to the single best action. In the next sections, we will greatly strengthen this result.
The algorithm Exp3, described in Figure 1 , is a variant of the algorithm Hedge introduced by Freund and Schapire [6] for solving a different worst-case sequential allocation problem. On each time step t, Exp3 draws an action i t according to the distribution p 1 (t), . . . , p K (t). This distribution is a mixture of the uniform distribution and a distribution which assigns to each action a probability mass exponential in the estimated cumulative reward for that action. Intuitively, mixing in the uniform distribution is done to make sure that the algorithm tries out all K actions and gets good estimates of the rewards for each. Otherwise, the algorithm might miss a good action because the initial rewards it observes for this action are low and large rewards that occur later are not observed because the action is not selected.
For the drawn action i t , Exp3 sets the estimated rewardx it (t) to x it (t)/p it (t). Dividing the actual gain by the probability that the action was chosen compensates the reward of actions that are unlikely to be chosen. This choice of estimated rewards guarantees that their expectations are equal to the actual rewards for each action; that is, For each t = 1, 2, . . . the random choice of i t at trial t given the choices i 1 , . . . , i t−1 in the previous t − 1 trials. We now give the first main theorem of this paper, which bounds the expected weak regret of algorithm Exp3.
Set
p i (t) = (1 − γ) w i (t) K j=1 w j (t) + γ K i = 1, . . . , K.
Draw i t randomly accordingly to the probabilities
Theorem 3.1. For any K > 0 and for any γ ∈ (0, 1],
holds for any assignment of rewards and for any T > 0. To understand this theorem, it is helpful to consider a simpler bound which can be obtained by an appropriate choice of the parameter γ.
Corollary 3.2. For any T > 0, assume that g ≥ G max and that algorithm Exp3 is run with input parameter
, then the bound is trivial since the expected regret cannot be more than g. Otherwise, by Theorem 3.1, the expected regret is at most
To apply Corollary 3.2, it is necessary that an upper bound g on G max (T ) be available for tuning γ. For example, if the time horizon T is known, then, since no action can have payoff greater than 1 on any trial, we can use g = T as an upper bound. In section 4, we give a technique that does not require prior knowledge of such an upper bound, yielding a result which uniformly holds over T .
If Proof of Theorem 3.1. The theorem is clearly true for γ = 1, so assume 0 < γ < 1. Here (and also throughout the paper without explicit mention) we use the following simple facts, which are immediately derived from the definitions:
Equation (5) uses the definition of p i (t) in Figure 1 . Equation (6) uses the fact that e x ≤ 1 + x + (e − 2)x 2 for x ≤ 1; the expression in the preceding line is at most 1 by (2). Equation (8) uses (3) and (4) . Taking logarithms and using 1 + x ≤ e x gives ln
Summing over t we then get
For any action j,
Combining this with (9), we get
We next take the expectation of both sides of (10) 
Combining (10) and (11), we find that
Since j was chosen arbitrarily and
we obtain the inequality in the statement of the theorem. Additional notation. As our other player algorithms will be variants of Exp3, we find it convenient to define some further notation based on the quantities used in the analysis of Exp3.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ K and for each t ≥ 1, define
Bounds on the weak regret that uniformly hold over time.
In section 3, we showed that Exp3 yields an expected regret of O( √ Kg ln K) whenever an upper bound g on the return G max of the best action is known in advance. A bound of O( √ KT ln K), which holds uniformly over T , could be easily proven via the "guessing techniques" which will be used to prove Corollaries 8.4 and 8.5 in section 8. In this section, instead, we describe an algorithm, called Exp3.1, whose expected weak regret is O(
this bound is never worse than O(
√ KT ln K) and is substantially better whenever the return of the best arm is small compared to T . Repeat for r = 0, 1, 2, . . .
(a) Let i t be the random action chosen by Exp3 and x it (t) the corresponding reward. Our algorithm Exp3.1, described in Figure 2 , proceeds in epochs, where each epoch consists of a sequence of trials. We use r = 0, 1, 2, . . . to index the epochs. On epoch r, the algorithm "guesses" a bound g r for the return of the best action. It then uses this guess to tune the parameter γ of Exp3, restarting Exp3 at the beginning of each epoch. As usual, we use t to denote the current time step.
2 Exp3.1 maintains an estimateĜ i (t + 1) of the return of each action i. Since E[x i (t)] = x i (t), this estimate will be unbiased in the sense that E[Ĝ i (t + 1)] = G i (t + 1) for all i and t. Using these estimates, the algorithm detects (approximately) when the actual gain of some action has advanced beyond g r . When this happens, the algorithm goes on to the next epoch, restarting Exp3 with a larger bound on the maximal gain.
The performance of the algorithm is characterized by the following theorem which is the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.1. For any K > 0,
holds for any assignment of rewards and for any T > 0. The proof of the theorem is divided into two lemmas. The first bounds the regret suffered on each epoch, and the second bounds the total number of epochs.
Fix T arbitrarily and define the following random variables: Let R be the total number of epochs (i.e., the final value of r). Let S r and T r be the first and last time steps completed on epoch r (where, for convenience, we define T R = T ). Thus, epoch r consists of trials S r , S r + 1, . . . , T r . Note that, in degenerate cases, some epochs may be empty in which case S r = T r + 1. LetĜ max =Ĝ max (T + 1).
Lemma 4.2. For any action j and for every epoch r,
Proof. If S r > T r (so that no trials occur on epoch r), then the lemma holds trivially since both summations will be equal to zero. Assume then that S r ≤ T r . Let g = g r and γ = γ r . We use (10) from the proof of Theorem 3.1:
From the definition of the termination condition we know thatĜ
By our choice for γ, we get the statement of the lemma. The next lemma gives an implicit upper bound on the number of epochs R.
The number of epochs R satisfies
Proof. If R = 0, then the bound holds trivially. So assume R ≥ 1. Let z = 2 R−1 . Because epoch R − 1 was completed, by the termination condition,
Suppose the claim of the lemma is false. Then z > K/c + Ĝ max /c. Since the function cx 2 − Kx is increasing for x > K/(2c), this implies that
contradicting (12) . Proof of Theorem 4.1. Using the lemmas, we have that
Here, we used Lemma 4.2 for the first inequality and Lemma 4.3 for the second inequality. The other steps follow from definitions and simple algebra.
Let
Taking expectations of both sides of (13) gives
Since the second derivative of f is positive for x > 0, f is convex so that, by Jensen's inequality,
Note that
The function f is increasing if and only if
Combined with (14) and (15), this gives that E[G Exp3.1 ] ≥ f (G max ), which is equivalent to the statement of the theorem. On the other hand, if
so the theorem trivially follows in this case as well.
Lower bounds on the weak regret.
In this section, we state a lower bound on the expected weak regret of any player. More precisely, for any choice of the time horizon T we show that there exists a strategy for assigning the rewards to the actions such that the expected weak regret of any player algorithm is Ω( √ KT ). Observe that this does not match the upper bound for our algorithms Exp3 and Exp3.1 (see Corollary 3.2 and Theorem 4.1); it is an open problem to close this gap.
Our lower bound is proven using the classical (statistical) bandit model with a crucial difference: the reward distribution depends on the number K of actions and on the time horizon T . This dependence is the reason why our lower bound does not contradict the upper bounds of the form O(ln T ) for the classical bandit model [14] . There, the distribution over the rewards is fixed as T → ∞.
Note that our lower bound has a considerably stronger dependence on the number K of action than the lower bound Θ( √ T ln K), which could have been directly proven from the results in [3, 6] . Specifically, our lower bound implies that no upper bound is possible of the form The proof is given in Appendix A. The lower bound implies, of course, that for any algorithm there is a particular choice of rewards that will cause the expected weak regret (where the expectation is now with respect to the algorithm's internal randomization only) to be larger than this value. For each t = 1, 2, . . . , T 1.
2. Choose i t randomly according to the distribution 6. Bounds on the weak regret that hold with probability 1. In section 4 we showed that the expected weak regret of algorithm Exp3.1 is O( √ KT ln K). In this section we show that a modification of Exp3 achieves a weak regret of O( KT ln(KT /δ)) with probability at least 1 − δ, for any fixed δ and uniformly over T . From this, a bound on the weak regret that holds with probability 1 easily follows.
The modification of Exp3 is necessary since the variance of the regret achieved by this algorithm is large-so large that an interesting high probability bound may not hold. The large variance of the regret comes from the large variance of the estimatesx i (t) for the payoffs x i (t). In fact, the variance ofx i (t) can be close to 1/p i (t), which, for γ in our range of interest, is (ignoring the dependence of K) of magnitude √ T . Summing over trials, the variance of the return of Exp3 is about T 3/2 , so that the regret might be as large as T 3/4 . To control the variance we modify algorithm Exp3 so that it uses estimates which are based on upper confidence bounds instead of estimates with the correct expectation. The modified algorithm Exp3.P is given in Figure 3 . Let
Whereas algorithm Exp3 directly uses the estimatesĜ i (t) when choosing i t at random, algorithm Exp3.P uses the upper confidence boundsĜ i (t) + ασ i (t). The next lemma shows that, for appropriate α, these are indeed upper confidence bounds. Fix some time horizon T . In what follows, we will useσ i to denoteσ i (T + 1) andĜ i to denoteĜ i (T + 1).
Proof. Fix some i and set
.
where in step (16) we multiplied both sides by s T and usedσ i ≥ T t=1 1/(p i (t) √ KT ), while in step (17) we used Markov's inequality. For t = 1, . . . , T set
Then, for t = 2, . . . , T
Denote by
. . , i t−1 ] the expectation of Z t with respect to the random choice in trial t and conditioned on the past t − 1 trials. Note that when the past t − 1 trials are fixed the only random quantities in Z t are thex i (t)'s. Note also that x i (t) −x i (t) ≤ 1 and that
Hence, for each t = 2, . . . , T 
get by induction that E[Z T ] ≤ T , and the lemma follows by our choice of α.
The next lemma shows that the return achieved by algorithm Exp3.P is close to its upper confidence bounds. Let
Proof. We proceed as in the analysis of algorithm Exp3. Set η = γ/(3K) and consider any sequence i 1 , . . . , i T of actions chosen by Exp3.P.
Therefore,
The second inequality uses e a ≤ 1 + a + a 2 for a ≤ 1, and (a + b) 2 ≤ 2(a 2 + b 2 ) for any a, b. The last inequality uses (2), (3), and (4). Taking logarithms, using ln(1 + x) ≤ x, and summing over t = 1, . . . , T , we get implies α ≤ 2 √ KT for our choice of α. So we can apply Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2. By Lemma 6.2 we have
By Lemma 6.1 we haveÛ ≥ G max with probability at least 1 − δ. Collecting terms and using G max ≤ T gives the theorem. It is not difficult to obtain an algorithm that does not need the time horizon T as input parameter and whose regret is only slightly worse than that proven for the algorithm Exp3.P in Theorem 6.3. This new algorithm, called Exp3.P.1 and shown in Figure 4 , simply restarts Exp3.P doubling its guess for T each time. The only crucial issue is the choice of the confidence parameter δ and of the minimum length of the runs to ensure that Lemma 6.1 holds for all the runs of Exp3.P.
Theorem 6.4. Let r * be as in (24). Let K ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 1), and T ≥ 2 r * . Let c T = 2 ln(2 + log 2 T ). Then
holds with probability at least 1 − δ. Proof. Choose the time horizon T arbitrarily and call epoch the sequence of trials between two successive restarts of algorithm Exp3.P.
For each r > r * , where r * is defined in (24), let
and similarly define the quantities G i (r * ) andĜ i (r * ) with sums that go from t = 1 to t = 2 r * +1 . For each r ≥ r * , we have δ r ≥ KT r e −KTr . Thus we can find numbers α r such that, by Lemma 6.1,
We now apply Theorem 6.3 to each epoch. Since T ≥ 2 r * , there is an ≥ 1 such that
With probability at least 1−δ over the random draw of Exp3. P.1's actions i 1 , . . . , i T ,
where c T = 2 ln(2 + log 2 T ).
From the above theorem we get, as a simple corollary, a statement about the almost sure convergence of the return of algorithm Exp3.P. The rate of convergence is almost optimal, as one can see from our lower bound in section 5.
Corollary 6.5. For any K ≥ 2 and for any function f : R → R with
holds for any assignment of rewards with probability 1.
Proof. Let δ = 1/T 2 . Then, by Theorem 6.4, there exists a constant C such that for all T large enough
with probability at least 1 − 1/T 2 . This implies that
and the theorem follows from the Borel-Cantelli lemma.
7. The regret against the best strategy from a pool. Consider a setting where the player has preliminarily fixed a set of strategies that could be used for choosing actions. These strategies might select different actions at different iterations. The strategies can be computations performed by the player or they can be external advice given to the player by "experts." We will use the more general term "expert" (borrowed from Cesa-Bianchi et al. [3] ) because we place no restrictions on the generation of the advice. The player's goal in this case is to combine the advice of the experts in such a way that its return is close to that of the best expert.
Formally, an expert i is an infinite sequence
K of probability vectors, where the jth component ξ i j (t) of ξ i (t) represents the recommended probability of playing action j at time t. An adversarial bandit problem with N experts is thus specified by both an assignment of rewards to actions and by an assignment of probability vectors to each expert. We assume that the player, prior to choosing an action at time t, is provided with the set ξ
(As a special case, the distribution can be concentrated on a single action, which represents a deterministic recommendation.) If the vector of rewards at time t is x(t), then the expected reward for expert i, with respect to the chosen probability vector ξ i (t), is simply ξ i (t) · x(t). In analogy of G max , we definẽ
measuring the expected return of the best strategy. Then the regret for the best strategy at time horizon T , defined byG max (T ) − G A (T ), measures the difference between the return of the best expert and player's A return up to time T . We could at this point view each expert as a "meta-action" in a higher-level bandit problem with payoff vector defined at trial t as (ξ
(t)). We could then immediately apply Corollary 3.2 to obtain a bound of O(
√ gN log N ) on the player's regret relative to the best expert (where g is an upper bound onG max ). However, this bound is quite weak if the player is combining many experts (i.e., if N is very large). We show below that the algorithm Exp3 from section 3 can be modified yielding a regret term of the form O( √ gK log N ). This bound is very reasonable when the number of actions is small, but the number of experts is quite large (even exponential).
Our algorithm Exp4 is shown in Figure 5 , and is only a slightly modified version of Exp3. (Exp4 stands for "exponential-weight algorithm for exploration and exploitation using expert advice.") Let us define y(t) ∈ [0, 1] N to be the vector with components corresponding to the gains of the experts: y i (t) = ξ i (t) · x(t). The simplest possible expert is one which always assigns uniform weight to all actions so that ξ j (t) = 1/K on each round t. We call this the uniform expert. To prove our results, we need to assume that the uniform expert is included in the family of experts.
3 Clearly, the uniform expert can always be added to any given family of experts at the very small expense of increasing N by one.
Theorem 7.1. For any K, T > 0, for any γ ∈ (0, 1], and for any family of experts which includes the uniform expert,
holds for any assignment of rewards. 3 In fact, we can use a slightly weaker sufficient condition, namely, that the uniform expert is included in the convex hull of the family of experts, i.e., that there exists nonnegative numbers α 1 , . . . , α N with N j=1 α j = 1 such that, for all t and all i,
Algorithm Exp4
Parameters: Real γ ∈ (0, 1]. Initialization: w i (1) = 1 for i = 1, . . . , N.   For each t = 1, 2, . . .
Get advice vectors ξ
3. Draw action i t randomly according to the probabilities
, Proof. We prove this theorem along the lines of the proof of Theorem 3.1. Let
Taking logarithms and summing over t we get
Since, for any expert k,
Therefore, for all experts k,
We now take expectations of both sides of this inequality. Note that
Further,
since we have assumed that the uniform expert is included in the family of experts. Combining these facts immediately implies the statement of the theorem. For each t = 1, 2, . . . 8. The regret against arbitrary strategies. In this section we present a variant of algorithm Exp3 and prove a bound on its expected regret for any sequence (j 1 , . . . , j T ) of actions. To prove this result, we rank all sequences of actions according to their "hardness." The hardness of a sequence (j 1 , . . . , j T ) is defined by
Set
p i (t) = (1 − γ) w i (t) K j=1 w j (t) + γ K , i= 1, . . . , K.
Draw i t according to the probabilities
So, h(1, . . . , 1) = 1 and h(1, 1, 3, 2, 2) = 3. The bound on the regret which we will prove grows with the hardness of the sequence for which we are measuring the regret. In particular, we will show that the player algorithm Exp3.S described in Figure 6 has an expected regret of O(h(j T ) KT ln(KT )) for any sequence j T = (j 1 , . . . , j T ) of actions. On the other hand, if the regret is measured for any sequence j T of actions of hardness h(j T ) ≤ S, then the expected regret of Exp3.S (with parameters tuned to this S) reduces to O( SKT ln(KT )). In what follows, we will use G j T to denote the return
. . , j T ) of actions. Theorem 8.1. For any K > 0, for any γ ∈ (0, 1], and for any α > 0, 
holds for any sequence j T = (j 1 , . . . , j T ) of actions. Note that the statement of Corollary 8.2 can be equivalently written as
revealing that algorithm Exp3.S is able to automatically trade-off between the return G j T of a sequence j T and its hardness h(j T ). Corollary 8.3. Assume that algorithm Exp3.S is run with input parameters α = 1/T and
holds for any sequence 
where, as usual, W t = w 1 (t)+· · ·+w K (t). Now let S = h(j T ) and partition (1, . . . , T ) in segments
Taking logarithms on both sides of (25) and summing over t = T s , . . . , T s+1 − 1, we get
Now let j be the action such that j Ts = · · · = j Ts+1−1 = j. Since
where the last step uses γx j (t)/K ≤ 1, we have
Piecing together (26) and (27) we get
Summing over all segments s = 1, . . . , S, taking expectation with respect to the random choices of algorithm Exp3.S, and using
yields the inequality in the statement of the theorem. If the time horizon T is not known, we can apply techniques similar to those applied for proving Theorem 6.4 in section 6. More specifically, we introduce a new algorithm, Exp3.S.1, that runs Exp3.S as a subroutine. Suppose that at each new run (or epoch) r = 0, 1, . . . , Exp3.S is started with its parameters set as prescribed in Corollary 8.2, where T is set to T r = 2 r , and then stopped after T r iterations. Clearly, for any fixed sequence j T = (j 1 , . . . , j T ) of actions, the number of segments (see proof of Theorem 8.1 for a definition of segment) within each epoch r is at most h(j T ). Hence the expected regret of Exp3.S.1 for epoch r is certainly not more than
Let be such that 2 ≤ T < 2 +1 . Then the last epoch is ≤ log 2 T and the overall regret (over the + 1 epochs) is at most
Finishing up the calculations proves the following. Corollary 8.4.
for any T > 0 and for any sequence j T = (j 1 , . . . , j T ) of actions. On the other hand, if Exp3.S.1 runs Exp3.S with parameters set as prescribed in Corollary 8.3, with a reasoning similar to the one above we conclude the following.
Corollary 8.5.
for any T > 0 and for any sequence j T = (j 1 , . . . , j T ) of actions such that h(j T ) ≤ S.
9. Applications to game theory. The adversarial bandit problem can be easily related to the problem of playing repeated games. For N > 1 integer, an N -person finite game is defined by N finite sets S 1 , . . . , S N of pure strategies, one set for each player, and by N functions u 1 , . . . , u N , where function u i : S 1 × · · · × S N → R is player's i payoff function. Note the each player's payoff depends both on the pure strategy chosen by the player and on the pure strategies chosen by the other players. Let S = S 1 × · · · × S N , and let
We use s and s −i to denote typical members of, respectively, S and S −i . Given s ∈ S, we will often write (j, s −i ) to denote (s 1 , . . . , s i−1 , j, s i+1 , . . . , s N ), where j ∈ S i . Suppose that the game is repeatedly played through time. Assume for now that each player knows all payoff functions and, after each repetition (or round) t, also knows the vector s(t) = (s 1 (t), . . . , s N (t)) of pure strategies chosen by the players. Hence, the pure strategy s i (t) chosen by player i at round t may depend on what player i and the other players chose in the past rounds. The average regret of player i for the pure strategy j after T rounds is defined by
This is how much player i lost on average for not playing the pure strategy j on all rounds, given that all the other players kept their choices fixed.
A desirable property for a player is Hannan-consistency [8] , defined as follows.
with probability 1.
The existence and properties of Hannan-consistent players have been first investigated by Hannan [10] and Blackwell [2] and later by many others (see [5] for a nice survey).
Hannan-consistency can be also studied in the so-called unknown game setup, where it is further assumed that (1) each player knows neither the total number of players nor the payoff function of any player (including itself), (2) after each round each player sees its own payoffs but it sees neither the choices of the other players nor the resulting payoffs. This setup was previously studied by Baños [1] , Megiddo [16] , and by Hart and Mas-Colell [11, 12] .
We can apply the results of section 6 to prove that a player using algorithm Exp3.P.1 as mixed strategy is Hannan-consistent in the unknown game setup whenever the payoffs obtained by the player belong to a known bounded real interval. To do that, we must first extend our results to the case when the assignment of rewards can be chosen adaptively. More precisely, we can view the payoff x it (t), received by the gambler at trial t of the bandit problem, as the payoff u i (i t , s −i (t)) received by player i at the tth round of the game. However, unlike our adversarial bandit can show that the row player can play in such a manner that its payoff per round will rapidly converge to the optimal maximin payoff v. [·] will also be used.
Let A be the player strategy. Let r t = x it (t) be a random variable denoting the reward received at time t, and let r t denote the sequence of rewards received up through trial t: r t = r 1 , . . . , r t . For shorthand, r = r T is the entire sequence of rewards.
Any randomized playing strategy is equivalent to an a priori random choice from the set of all deterministic strategies. Thus, because the adversary strategy we have defined is oblivious to the actions of the player, it suffices to prove an upper bound on the expected gain of any deterministic strategy (this is not crucial for the proof but simplifies the notation). Therefore, we can formally regard the algorithm A as a fixed function which, at each step t, maps the reward history r t−1 to its next action i t . As usual, G A = T t=1 r t denotes the return of the algorithm, and G max = max j T t=1 x j (t) is the return of the best action. Let N i be a random variable denoting the number of times action i is chosen by A. Our first lemma bounds the difference between expectations when measured using E i [·] 
Proof. We apply standard methods that can be found, for instance, in Cover and Thomas [4] . For any distributions P and Q, let The second equality can be seen as follows: Regardless of the past history of rewards r t−1 , the conditional probability distribution P unif {r t | r t−1 } on the next reward r t is uniform on {0, 1}. The conditional distribution P i {r t | r t−1 } is also easily computed: Given r t−1 , the next action i t is fixed by A. If this action is not the good action i, then the conditional distribution is uniform on {0, 1}; otherwise, if i t = i, then r t is 1 with probability 1/2 + and 0 otherwise.
The lemma now follows by combining (28), (29), and (30).
We are now ready to prove the theorem. Specifically, we show the following. Theorem A.2. For any player strategy A, and for the distribution on rewards described above, the expected regret of algorithm A is lower bounded by
